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Abstract
We examine the real option implicit in countriesdecisions of whether
to join a monetary union and calibrate our theoretical model for the
core ASEAN/AFTA group of Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singa-
pore and Thailand. None of the countries would be prepared to join
a monetary union amongst them at present, and most have low to
negligible probabilities of ever wanting to do so.
1 Introduction
With the EuropeanMonetary Union in operation since 1999, focus has shifted
to other areas of the world, particularly Asia, to examine whether similar
ventures might be viable or desirable there.1 Policymakers are generally con-
cerned about ination performance, possibly because a time inconsistency
problem in monetary policymaking can cause an undesirable ination bias
to persist.2 If the future evolution of such ination preferences is uncertain,
the decision to join a monetary union represents a real option due to policy-
makersreluctance to commit to a largely irreversible move that could later
prove less advantageous than initially thought.3
1See e.g. Eichengreen/Bayoumi (1999).
2See e.g. Barro/Gordon (1983).
3See e.g. Dixit/Pindyck (1994).
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In this paper we extend and apply the theoretical model of Strobel (2002,
2005) in examining this real option implicit in countriesdecisions of whether
to join a monetary union when the costs of later leaving it again are consid-
ered prohibitively high and there is uncertainty over the future benets of
such a move. We calibrate our model for the core ASEAN/AFTA countries of
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand by proxying pol-
icymakersstochastic ination biases with unemployment rates, derive the
proxied trigger values of relative ination bias parameters for di¤erent time
horizons and contrast them with the corresponding actual ratios for 2003,
our reference period. We nd that none of the countries considered would be
prepared to join a monetary union amongst them at present, most of them
have low to negligible probabilities of ever wanting to do so, whilst also not
expecting that event to occur in nite time. Those countries thus appear too
heterogenous and variable at the moment to make formation of a monetary
union much of a realistic prospect in the near future.
Section 2 now presents the model; the results of our calibration exercise
are reported in section 3, and section 4 concludes the paper.
2 The model
Policymakers in countries c and the potential wider union u are assumed to
be exclusively concerned with ination performance; they face instantaneous
loss rates lit = it , where exogenous ination biases it  0 follow geometric
Brownian motions4
dit = iitdzit ; i = c; u (1)
with i > 0 , dzit = "it
p
dt are increments of Wiener processes with "it 
NID(0; 1) , and Et(dzctdzut) = dt with  the coe¢ cient of correlation be-
tween the processes zit (and  1   < 1).
The expected present discounted value of losses associated with ination
performance is then5
4Similar frameworks are used in Strobel (2002, 2005).
5See e.g. Dixit (1993, eq. (2.7)).
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Lit = Et
Z 1
t
lie
 ( t)d =
it

(2)
where  > 0 is the (possibly subjective) discount rate.
The decision of a country c on whether or not to join the wider monetary
union u then involves solving the Bellman equation for the optimal stopping
problem
F (Lc; Lu) = max

Lc   Lu ; 1
dt
Et[dF (Lc; Lu)]

(3)
where F (Lc; Lu) is the value to country c of the option of joining the wider
monetary union u , and Lc   Lu is the expected discounted benet of such
a move when any other cost/benets are abstracted from.6 Note that this
implicitly assumes that joining a monetary union is an irreversible process,
so that the costs of possibly later leaving it again are considered prohibitively
high. We can then obtain
Proposition 1 Country c will want to exercise the option of joining the
wider monetary union u if
u
c
 

u
c
=
1   1
1
where 1 =
1
2
0@1 + 1q
1  83
83+c2 2  c u+u2
1A
Otherwise it will keep the option unexercised, with expected time and proba-
bility of future exercise of
T

u
c

=
8<: 1 if u
2  c2
ln

u
c

 ln

u
c

1
2
(c2 u2) if u
2 > c
2
P

u
c

=
8><>:
1 if u2  c2
exp

ln

u
c

 ln

u
c

(c2 u2)
c2 2cu+u2

if u2 < c2
6We drop time subscripts for ease of notation.
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Proof. See Appendix.
Country c perceives exercise of the option of joining the wider monetary
union u as desirable only when the current value of relative ination bias
parameters u
c
is less than (or equal to) its trigger value 

u
c
; intuitively, the
higher a countrys ination bias relative to the potential wider unions, the
more it stands to gain from giving up its monetary independence. While
u
c
> 

u
c
applies, on the other hand, country c strictly prefers to leave the
option of monetary integration unexercised and remains outside the wider
union for the time being; in this case, we can further derive the expected
time and probability of its potential future exercise of that option.
3 A simple calibration
We proceed to calibrate the model in Section 2 for the core ASEAN/AFTA
countries of Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand by
proxying national policymakersinherent ination biases c with unemploy-
ment rates; this reects the familiar rationale for the potential benets of
surprise ination based on the expectational Phillips curve.7
Using annual data for the period 1986-2003 drawn from the Asian De-
velopment Banks Key Indicators 2004,8 we calculate the required moments
from the respective transformed series ln( xt
xt 1
) to reect our distributional
assumption of eq. (1); these are reported in Table 1. The potential mone-
tary unions ination bias u is for these purposes constructed as the simple
arithmetic mean of the constituent countriesproxied values; this mimics a
bargaining outcome over the unions monetary policy where individual mem-
ber countries have equal votes.
The proxied trigger values of relative ination bias parameters 

u
c
, from
Proposition 1, are then computed for time horizons of 10 and 25 years by
applying discount rates of 12.5% and 5.5%, respectively, to allow for varying
degrees of policymakersmyopia.9 These results, together with the proxied
7See e.g. Barro/Gordon (1983).
8Available at www.adb.org/statistics .
9Given our innite horizon framework, these approximate the application of a (real)
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StDev Corr w/ All Corr w/ MST
Indonesia 0.205 0.574
Malaysia 0.143 0.728 0.706
Philippines 0.105 0.588
Singapore 0.259 0.621 0.763
Thailand 0.511 0.683 0.790
All 0.129 1.000
MST 0.206 1.000
Source: Asian Development Bank (ADB) - Key Indicators 2004
Table 1: Standard deviations & correlation coe¢ cients
Ratio w/ All ('03) Trigger ratio w/ All
10 year 25 year
Indonesia 0.620 0.109 0.011
Malaysia 1.630 0.228 0.031
Philippines 0.583 0.209 0.027
Singapore 1.253 0.078 0.008
Thailand 3.824 0.020 0.002
Source: Asian Development Bank (ADB) - Key Indicators 2004
Table 2: Ratios & trigger ratios with All
values for the relative ination bias parameters u
c
for 2003, our reference
period, are presented in Tables 2 and 3 both for a potential monetary union
comprising all ve countries (All) as well as a narrower one (MST) consist-
ing only of Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand (the low-unemployment group
in our reference period). Table 4 then gives the expected times and prob-
abilities, from the second part of Proposition 1, of the option of monetary
integration potentially being exercised at some point in the future for those
di¤erent constellations.
From Table 2 we observe that none of the countries considered would be
prepared to join a monetary union comprising the whole group at present,
irrespective of time horizon. Table 4 further indicates that, apart from the
Philippines which has expected joining times hundreds of years above the
discount rate of 2.5% over those nite time horizons.
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Ratio w/ MST ('03) Trigger ratio w/MST
10 year 25 year
Malaysia 0.909 0.137 0.015
Singapore 0.699 0.110 0.012
Thailand 2.132 0.027 0.002
Source: Asian Development Bank (ADB) - Key Indicators 2004
Table 3: Ratios & trigger ratios with MST
All MST
10yrs 25yrs 10yrs 25yrs
Prob Time Prob Time Prob Time Prob Time
Indonesia 0.210 inf 0.028 inf
Malaysia 0.486 inf 0.233 inf 1.000 171.6 1.000 370.9
Philippines 1.000 359.4 1.000 1076.6
Singapore 0.036 inf 0.002 inf 0.196 inf 0.027 inf
Thailand 0.001 inf 0.000 inf 0.001 inf 0.000 inf
Source: Asian Development Bank (ADB) - Key Indicators 2004
Table 4: Probabilities & expected times
time horizon, none of them ever expects wanting to do so. Malaysia and
Indonesia have otherwise the highest probabilities of ever wanting to join
a monetary union comprising the whole group, while those probabilities are
negligible for Singapore and Thailand, particularly for the longer time horizon
where uncertainty leads to signicantly more cautious behavior.
We observe similar results for the sub-group of Malaysia, Singapore and
Thailand: Table 3 shows that none of them would be prepared to join a
narrow monetary union between them at present either, irrespective of time
horizon. While Malaysia expects future joining dates that lie only very sub-
stantially above the time horizons considered, Singapore and Thailand never
expect wanting to join at all, and it is then only Singapore for the 10 year
horizon that has a non-negligible probability of ever wanting to be part of
such a union.
To sum up the results of our simple calibrations: the ve ASEAN/AFTA
6
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countries considered appear at present too heterogenous and variable to make
formation of a monetary union amongst them much of a realistic prospect in
the near future, as the value of waiting associated with such a major regime
shift proves rather substantial for the criteria considered.
4 Conclusion
We examined the real option implicit in countriesdecisions of whether to
join a monetary union and calibrated our theoretical model for the core
ASEAN/AFTA gr up of Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and
Thailand. We found that none of the countries considered would be prepared
to join a monetary union amongst them at present and that most of them
have low to negligible probabilities of ever wanting to do so. Those countries
thus appear too heterogenous and variable at the moment to make formation
of a monetary union much of a realistic prospect in the near future.
Appendix
Proof. (Proposition 1) For country c , not joining the wider monetary union
u for a further instant dt is optimal in the continuation region of the optimal
stopping problem eq. (3), giving the relevant Bellman equation as
F (Lc; Lu) =
1
dt
Et[dF (Lc; Lu)] (4)
Applying Itos Lemma to eq. (4) and noting that the value function F (Lc; Lu)
should be homogeneous of degree 1,10 so that F (Lc; Lu) = Luf( ) where
   Lc
Lu
,11 we obtain
1
2
 
c
2   2  c u + u2

 2 f 00( )  3 f( ) = 0 (5)
10This adopts the solution strategy in Dixit and Pindyck (1994, p. 210).
11Thus,   = cu from eq. (2).
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as the di¤erential equation that characterizes the evolution of f( ) in that
region.
We solve equation (5) by standard methods, using the value-matching
and smooth-pasting conditions f( ) =     1 and @f( )
@ 
= 1 , plus the
boundary condition f(0) = 0 ,12 and thus obtain
  =
1
1   1
> 1
where 1 =
1
2
0@1 + 1q
1  83
83+c2 2  c u+u2
1A > 1
as the critical (trigger) value  . From the denition of   it then follows
that 

u
c
= ( ) 1 is the trigger value of relative ination bias parameters
u
c
separating the region in (c; u) space where country cs option of mone-
tary integration remains unexercised (i.e. for u
c
> 

u
c
) from the one where
immediate exercise of that option is perceived as optimal (i.e. for u
c
 u
c
).
The expected time T

u
c

and probability P

u
c

for the process u
c
to
reach the barrier 

u
c
from any position within the continuation region (thus
triggering country cs desired move towards monetary integration) is then
derived using standard properties of Brownian motion.13
12The geometric Brownian motion   has an absorbing barrier at zero.
13See e.g. Dixit (1993, eq. (6.5) and (6.10)).
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